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VACANT REFORM: WHY THE FEDERAL
VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
JOSHUA L. STAYN
INTRODUCTION
The way executive branch officials are nominated and confirmed
these days seems to please none of the people, none of the time.
Presidential supporters contend that senators are so ideologically
charged and so concerned with reelection that they block presidential
nominations “for reasons that have nothing to do with the nominee,
and everything to do with some unrelated dispute between president
and Senate.”1 Congressional supporters counter that the real problem
is that presidents are so obsessed with their public opinion ratings and
legacy that they misuse their nomination and appointment powers to
curry favor with special interest groups and to push the nation in im-
politic directions.2 And those who, favoring neither branch, merely
want a healthy democracy fear that the federal appointment process
recently has strayed too far from its constitutional roots.3 In an effort
Copyright © 2001 by Joshua L. Stayn.
1. A Tyrannous Minority, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 24.
2. James C. Ho, A Year of Bill Lann Lee, WASHWENTIETH 
CENTURY
FUND, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION 13, 21, 24 (1988) (criticizing President Ronald Reagan for attempting, as
his own Attorney General Edwin Meese admitted, to “institutionalize the Reagan revolution so
it can’t be set aside no matter what happens in future presidential elections” by administering an
ideological “litmus test” to potential judicial nominees); Jeffery H. Birnbaum, Clinton’s Choices
for Cabinet Posts Give Few Clues About His Plans for Change, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1992, at A3
(criticizing President-elect Bill Clinton for nominating four blacks, two Hispanics, and three
women to his initial cabinet based on little more than political symbolism, interest-group pres-
sure, and cronyism).
3. See generally OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS vi, 1, 4-8 (1996) [hereinafter
OBSTACLE COURSE] (concluding that the average confirmation time for a presidential ap-
pointee has more than quadrupled since the Kennedy administration, the appointment process
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to stop the perceived perversions of that process, a Republican-led
Congress enacted, and Democratic President Bill Clinton signed into
law, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998.4
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 completely rewrites
the law governing federal vacancies and employs new enforcement
mechanisms in an effort to ensure that the President respects the
Senate’s advice and consent role when appointing executive branch
officers.5 The Act states that it is the sole statutory vehicle for tempo-
rarily filling vacant positions pending confirmation, and it enumerates
the exclusive ways in which a President may make such temporary
appointments.6 It provides incentives for prompt submission of nomi-
has become more contentious and uncivil, and the American public has become more distrustful
of and alienated from the political system).
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349d (Supp. V 1999). In urging passage of the Act, co-sponsor Sena-
tor Robert Byrd (D-WV) admonished fellow senators that:
[E]ach time a vacancy is filled by an individual in violation of the Vacancies Act, yet
another pebble is washed off the riverbank of the Senate’s constitutional role . . . as
more and more of these pebbles tumble downstream, the bank weakens, until, finally,
it collapses . . . . [W]e have a responsibility to the American people and to . . . the
Senate . . . to shore up that riverbank, to stop the erosion that has taken place, and to
reverse the wretched trend of acquiescing on our constitutional duties that seems to
have so ominously infected this Senate.
144 CONG. REC. S11021-01, S11025 (Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
5. Executive branch officers, also called “Officers of the United States,” are individuals
appointed by the President, a court, or agency head, who exercise “significant authority” under
a federal statute in carrying out the “continuing and permanent” duties of the “public station, or
employment” which they hold. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (holding that Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution requires that most of the powers that the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 confers upon the Federal Election Commission be exercised only by
“Officers of the United States,” and that, as a result, the membership of the Federal Election
Commission was invalid); United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (holding that unless
a person holds a government position by virtue of appointment by the President, the courts, or a
department head legally authorized to make the appointment, that person is not an “officer” of
the United States); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 398 (1868) (reasoning that
the defendant, a clerk in an assistant U.S. treasurer’s office, was a public officer for the purpose
of the Sub-Treasury Act of 1846, which forbade public officials from misappropriating public
funds, but holding that the statute did not apply because the defendant’s office was not listed in
the statute). As of 1992, there were 1520 full-time and part-time executive branch positions re-
quiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. G. Calvin Mackenzie, The Presiden-
tial Appointment Process: Historical Development, Contemporary Operations, Current Issues, in
OBSTACLE COURSE, supra note 3, at 35, 43.
6. Three categories of temporary appointments exist: (1) those made under Article II,
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution during a Senate recess and lasting until the end of the
Senate’s next session; (2) those made under statutory authority and subject to a prescribed time
limitation, see infra notes 17-22, 52, and accompanying text; and (3) those deemed “temporary”
by the President to avoid the confirmation requirement for permanent appointments and any
time limit not set by the President. Lois Reznick, Note, Temporary Appointment Power of the
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nations and punishes statutory noncompliance. The Act also assigns
to executive agency heads and to the Comptroller General responsi-
bility for monitoring compliance with the Act and makes special pro-
visions for vacancies that result from a change of administration fol-
lowing a presidential election.7 Despite the likelihood that these
revisions will fundamentally alter the federal appointment process,
few supporters or critics of the current process have analyzed the con-
stitutionality of the Act.8
This Note undertakes such an analysis and concludes that the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 is unconstitutional. The Act
violates Article II by allowing the Senate unilaterally to nominate and
confirm or reject individuals whom the President has not actually
nominated; by interfering with the President’s exercise of his exclu-
sive constitutional power to make recess appointments; by facilitating
congressional encroachment on the President’s long-recognized pre-
rogative to nominate and control subordinate executive officers; and
by tilting the balance of appointment power dangerously toward a
new President during his first year in office.
Part I of this Note outlines the events leading to the passage of
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. Part II summarizes each
section of the Act and its intended function. Part III presents four ar-
guments against the constitutionality of the Act. Part IV concludes
that the Act should be repealed or substantially amended to cure its
constitutional defects, and suggests modifications that, if adopted,
might enable the Act constitutionally to meet the needs and objec-
tives of both the Senate and the President.
President, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 146, 147 n.9 (1973) (examining the language, history, and execu-
tive and judicial interpretations of the Appointments Clause).
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3349, 3349a (Supp. V 1999).
8. But see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 270-72, 379 n.29 (2000) (“[T]he new statute’s
effort to cover all temporary appointments to confirmable positions is constitutional. First, the
Constitution plainly empowers Congress to create and fund offices. . . . [T]his congressional
power has been granted without any explicit limitations; therefore, it presumably encompasses
the authority to establish the conditions for occupancy . . . .”); Morton Rosenberg, Congress Re-
forms Vacancies Act to Protect the Senate’s Confirmation Prerogative, ADMIN. L. & REG. NEWS,
Spring 1999, at 1-6 (arguing that a reviewing court would likely find that “the Act is the exclu-
sive vehicle for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent positions unless Congress expressly
provides otherwise.”).
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I.  BACKGROUND
A. The Framers’ Intent: Presidential Appointment Power
The allocation of the appointment power between the President
and Congress has evolved differently than the Framers intended. The
Framers’ competing views on the proper allocation of that power
have been thoroughly documented elsewhere.9 Nonetheless, it is
worth emphasizing that the Framers intended to make the President
alone constitutionally responsible for nominating and temporarily
appointing federal officers and to make the Senate responsible for
checking those powers.10 The Framers made those intentions clear in
both the text and structure of the Appointments Clause. That Clause
provides:
9. E.g., JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 17-19 (1968)
(“One group . . . [was] afraid of granting the appointing power to the executive . . . and believed
that the power would be more safely entrusted to the upper branch of the legislature. . . . An-
other group . . . favored the creation of a strong executive, who they believed would be better
qualified . . . than a numerous body.”); Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate,
the President, and Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1331, 1339-42
(1997) (summarizing the views of individual members of the Constitutional Convention con-
cerning the proper role of the President and Senate in making appointments); Christopher
Wolfe, The Senate’s Power to Give “Advice and Consent” in Judicial Appointments, 82 MARQ.
L. REV. 355, 357 (1999) (“Some delegates, then, were concerned that a president might use ap-
pointment to draw too much power to himself. Still, some of the delegates were concerned that
the Senate’s power to advise and consent would not amount to much.”); Stuart J. Chanen, Note,
Constitutional Restrictions on the President’s Power to Make Recess Appointments, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 191, 195 n.28 (1984) (“Some of the Framers argued that the executive should have the
whole appointment power, without restraint or qualification, in order to establish a strong na-
tional government. Others opposed vesting the uncontrolled power of appointment in a single
executive, fearing it would lead toward monarchy.”); Note, Power of Appointment to Public Of-
fice Under the Federal Constitution, 42 HARV. L. REV. 426, 428 (1929) (“The members of the
Convention were experienced in the practical administration of government. . . . They therefore
must have thought it best to permit the necessities and conveniences of government . . . to allo-
cate the power of appointment to that agency which could exercise it most efficiently.”).
10. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplo-
matic Appointments, in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1961) (1790) (stating that the Appointments Clause gives the Senate no independent power be-
cause the Constitution “gives the nomination . . . to the President, the appointment to him and
the Senate jointly, the commissioning to the President”); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H.
BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 383 (1996) (arguing that the
clear difference between a draft version of the Constitution that vested appointment authority
in the Senate and the finally adopted version of Article II indicates that the Framers intended to
deny Congress any authority to appoint “Officers of the United States”); Charles L. Black, Jr.,
A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 659 n.3
(1970) (arguing that the Senate’s consent is advisory because confirmation does not bind the
President to commission the confirmed nominee).
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[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law . . . .
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next session.11
Furthermore, the Clause is structured to give the President a signifi-
cant advantage in obtaining the confirmation of nominees. The
Clause makes it difficult for the Senate to reject a nominee absent
compelling reasons by authorizing the President to make repeated
nominations, placing the nomination and appointment powers in a
unitary branch, and formulating the Senate’s confirmation power as a
defensive veto.12 The Framers concentrated the nomination and tem-
porary appointment powers in the President to assure undivided ac-
countability for the initial choice of an appointee and to avoid the
“[i]ntrigue, partiality, and concealment” likely to arise in the selection
of appointees by a multimember body such as the Senate.13 As Alex-
ander Hamilton explained:
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally be-
get a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He
will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and
more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the
stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who
may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have fewer per-
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). Indeed, initially the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voted to give unilateral power to the President “to appoint to offices
in cases not otherwise provided for” in the Constitution. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 23 (4th ed. rev. 1997).
12. John O. McGinnis, Essay, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confir-
mation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 653-59 (1993)
(arguing that the structure of the Appointments Clause puts the political burden of proof on the
Senate to justify its rejection of a nominee by offering serious, publicly compelling reasons).
13. FISHER, supra note 11, at 23 (quoting Constitutional Convention delegate James Wil-
son); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 42 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) (remarks of Nathaniel Gorham) (arguing that lodging the appointment power in the Sen-
ate would “give full play to intrigue & cabal”) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION]. See generally James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in
Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 343-46 (1989) (citing the comments of
several delegates to the Convention warning that corruption and intrigue would result from
vesting the nomination or appointment powers in a diffuse, multimember body).
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sonal attachments to gratify than a body of men who may each be
supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less li-
able to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection.14
The Framers’ concerns, as articulated by Hamilton, have been echoed
periodically by all three branches of the federal government.15
B. Congress’s Efforts to Control Executive Branch Appointments
Although the Framers intended to empower the President alone
to nominate and temporarily appoint federal officers, the Framers
vested the power of advice and consent regarding nominees and ap-
pointees in the Senate in order to avoid the “incautious or corrupt
nominations” and “flagrant partiality or error” otherwise likely to re-
sult from presidential misuse of the appointment power.16 At least
since 1795, several Congresses have asserted that the Senate has some
discretion to limit the President’s choice of nominees and temporary
appointees, as well as their tenure in office.17 A common means by
which Congresses have done so is vacancies legislation.18 Enacted in
1868, the first Vacancies Act purported to restrict the President’s
temporary appointment options by requiring that a temporary or re-
cess appointee be either the first assistant to the vacant office or an
already confirmed federal officer.19 The 1868 Act also limited the cho-
sen appointee’s tenure to ten days.20 Subsequent Congresses have fur-
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 455-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. E.g., Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 n.4 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (quoting, with approval, Hamilton’s statement shown above); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803) (calling the nomination process the “sole act of the
president” and “completely voluntary”); see also 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 561 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reporting Congressman
Fisher Ames’s statement that the Senate, though it must evaluate a candidate, cannot nominate
one); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 187, 223 (1855) (stating that “howsoever a vacancy happens to exist, if it
exists, it may be filled by temporary appointment of the President”); Senator Charles McC.
Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection
Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 202 (1987) (stating that “[c]ertainly, as Hamilton argues, the
power to nominate is the president’s alone”).
16. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 80 (remarks of James
Madison).
17. The third Congress was the first to limit the pool and tenure of presidential nominees
or temporary appointees; it limited temporary assignees’ tenure in office to six months. Act of
Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415.
18. FISHER, supra note 11, at 39-43 (discussing Congress’s periodic efforts to impose statu-
tory restrictions on the President’s power to fill vacant advice and consent positions).
19. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168.
20. Id.
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ther amended that Act,21 forbidding the payment of salary to recess
appointees until the Senate confirms their appointment and requiring
that the President promptly submit nominations for vacant positions
after filling them with recess appointees.22 Some Congresses have
even defunded officer positions, set eligibility criteria, and threatened
to reject undesired nominees if the President did not withdraw their
names.23
Presidents from 1823 through 1879 used the Appointments
Clause, without Congress’s permission, to fill vacancies that arose
while the Senate was in session and to make successive recess ap-
pointments.24 Yet, almost all presidents from 1880 through 1972 ap-
pear to have respected Congress’s disapproval both of successive re-
cess appointments of the same or another officer to a vacant office
and of recess appointments to vacancies that did not occur during a
Senate recess.25
21. E.g., Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 113, 26 Stat. 733 (extending the temporary appointee’s
tenure to thirty days); Pub. L. No. 100-398, 102 Stat. 988 (1988), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3348,
amended by Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. § 3346 (1998) (extending the tem-
porary appointee’s tenure to 120 days). Under the statute in its present form, the appointee’s
tenure lasts until a successor is appointed or the absence or sickness ends. 5 U.S.C.
§ 3346 (Supp. V 1999).
22. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-61, § 610, 111 Stat. 1272, 1310 (1997) (barring payment to any person who fills an advice
and consent position for which he or she has already been nominated and rejected); 5 U.S.C. §
5503 (1994) (forbidding payment, except in enumerated circumstances, to unconfirmed recess
appointees who fill vacancies that existed while the Senate was in session); Tenure in Office
Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 431 (1867) (requiring that vacant or temporarily filled advice and con-
sent positions “remain in abeyance, without any salary, fees, or emoluments” if the President
does not promptly fill them with Senate-confirmed nominees during the next Senate session).
23. FISHER, supra note 11, at 26, 32-33, 43.
24. The presidents relied upon the opinions of their attorneys general, which at least one
circuit court has approved as precedent in the appointments context. United States v. Allocco,
305 F.2d 704, 713 (2d Cir. 1962) (“Our decision is not without precedent. The Attorneys-
General of the United States . . . have held in a long and continuous line of opinions that the
recess power extends to vacancies which arise while the Senate is in session.”); 12 Op. Att’y
Gen. 32, 39 (1866); 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 356 (1862); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 225-26 (1855); 4
Op. Att’y Gen. 523, 526 (1846); 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 525, 530 (1832); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 633
(1823).
25. 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 139, 141 (1920); 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 8, 9 (1891); 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 58,
59 (1884); 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 530, 531 (1883); 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 596, 597 (1880). But see, e.g., 23
Op. Att’y Gen. 599, 603 (1901) (Mr. Knox) (“If a temporary appointment could in this case be
legally made during the current adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no reason why such
an appointment should not be made during any adjournment, as from Thursday or Friday until
the following Monday.”).
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C. The President’s Reassertion of the Appointment Power
In 1973, President Richard Nixon asserted that the Vacancies
Act was only one possible means of temporarily filling advice and
consent positions and that the enabling statutes of some departments
and agencies, including the Justice Department, were equally legiti-
mate means of temporarily filling such positions.26 Specifically, the
Nixon Justice Department claimed that 28 U.S.C. § 509 and § 510
permitted the Attorney General “from time to time to make such
provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance
by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Jus-
tice of any function of the Attorney General.”27 The Justice Depart-
ment also claimed that these “vesting and delegation” provisions,
which date from the Department’s establishment in 1870, made the
time limitations in the Vacancies Act inapplicable to vacant positions
in any department.28
The refusal of the Nixon administration and subsequent presi-
dential administrations to comply with the Vacancies Act resulted in
a significant number of temporary appointees serving in violation of
Congress’s asserted limits and without the Senate’s advice and con-
sent. At the Justice Department alone, at least forty-eight people be-
tween 1981 and 1998 served as temporary appointees in advice and
consent positions for longer than the 120 days authorized by the Va-
cancies Act in effect during that time.29 And by February 28, 1998,
sixty-four of the 320 total advice and consent posts in the Clinton ad-
ministration (20%) were held by “acting” officials, forty-three of
whom had served more than the 120-day limit without a nomination
being submitted.30
D. Interbranch Conflict and the Emergence of the New Vacancies Act
The conflict between the President and the Senate over presiden-
tial noncompliance with the Vacancies Act came to a head in late
1997. Five months after Democratic President Bill Clinton nominated
prominent civil rights lawyer Bill Lann Lee to head the Justice De-
26. Morton Rosenberg, The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate’s Con-
firmation Prerogative, CRS REPT. 98-892A, Nov. 2, 1998, at 2-3.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id.
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partment’s Office of Civil Rights,31 the Republican-controlled Senate
Judiciary Committee refused to refer Lee for a Senate vote because
of concerns about his views on race-based preferences and affirmative
action.32 President Clinton briefly considered waiting until the Senate
adjourned for the winter holidays and then exercising his recess ap-
pointment power under Article II to appoint Lee for a year.33 When
Senate leaders threatened to retaliate if the President carried out this
constitutionally authorized end run around the confirmation process,34
President Clinton appointed Lee “acting” Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights.35
In response to the appointment, Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin Hatch wrote a letter to Attorney General Janet
Reno in which he argued that the Vacancies Act limited Lee’s service
as an acting executive branch official to 120 days.36 Although the let-
ter and the Act attracted media attention, many dismissed the Act as
“burdensome,” “obscure,” and “routinely ignore[d].”37 In both testi-
31. Naftali Bendavid, Clinton Picks a Civil Rights Chief, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1997, at 4. For
background information on Lee and his nomination, see Roberto Suro, Civil Rights Nominee
Has Made Allies of Adversaries; Solution-Oriented Lee Faces Scrutiny in Senate, WASH. POST,
Aug. 20, 1997, at A23 (discussing Lee’s career as a civil rights lawyer prior to his nomination).
32. Brannon P. Denning, Article II, the Vacancies Act and the Appointment of “Acting” Ex-
ecutive Branch Officials, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1039, 1039 (1998). The eighteen-member Senate
Committee on the Judiciary deadlocked 9-9 along party lines except for Senator Arlen Specter
(R-PA), who supported Lee’s nomination. Nancy E. Roman, Senate Panel Spikes Justice Nomi-
nation; Ships Lee’s Name Back to White House, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1997, at A1.
33. Jackie Calmes, Hatch Suggests Means of Filling Civil-Rights Job, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
1997, at A6.
34. Jonathan Peterson, Putting Lee in Rights Post Seen As Risky Clinton Move, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A1 (“Senate Republicans have warned that if Clinton makes a recess
appointment, they are prepared to retaliate on other White House nominees, program funding
and Democratic legislation.”). But cf. Chanen, supra note 9, at 201 n.67 (observing that the Sen-
ate, though able to express its disapproval of presidential recess appointments by refusing to
confirm recess appointees whose names later are submitted for permanent appointment, cannot
legally stop the President from making such appointments).
35. William Neikirk & Naftali Bendavid, Clinton Flanks GOP, Names Lee to Post; Civil
Rights Advocate to Be “Acting” Chief, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1997, at 6; Warren P. Strobel &
Nancy Roman, Lee Named Acting Rights Chief; Clinton’s Move Aimed at Cutting GOP Retalia-
tion, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A1.
36. Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to Janet Reno,
Attorney General (Dec. 19, 1997) (asking “how long [Attorney General Reno] intend[s] to have
Mr. Lee serve in. [sic] an acting capacity” and requesting a written opinion concerning the ap-
plicability of the Vacancies Act to Lee’s appointment or reasons that the Act is inapplicable)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also David Stout, Senator Asks How Long Rights
Choice Will Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997, at A6.
37. E.g., Sean Scully, Bid to Reform Vacancies Act up in Air, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998,
at A6 (“Democratic opponents of the bill don’t deny that presidents routinely ignore the Va-
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mony to Congress38 and a letter to Senator Hatch,39 the Administra-
tion responded that the Justice Department’s enabling statute super-
sedes the Vacancies Act and subjects acting appointees to “no precise
limit on the time during which an official may carry out the duties of a
vacant Senate-confirmed office.”40
Frustrated by President Clinton’s “blatant disregard of the Judi-
ciary Committee’s decision not to support his controversial choice” of
Lee and intent on “preserv[ing] and strengthen[ing] the advice and
consent role of the Senate,” Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV), Fred
Thompson (R-TN), Strom Thurmond (R-SC), and Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) proposed the Federal Vacancies Reform
Act of 1998 in June.41 The White House responded by threatening to
veto the Act unless the Senate amended it in three substantive ways
and stopped holding nominations “‘hostage’ for reasons totally unre-
lated to a nominee’s qualifications.”42 Ignoring those suggested revi-
sions, the sponsoring senators reintroduced the Act for full Senate
consideration in September 1998, but were unable to marshal the
necessary votes to stop debate and force a vote.43 The failure to end
debate was attributed to the Democrats’ desire that the Act require
cancies Act . . . .”); The Vacancy Act Fight, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1997, at A16 (referring to the
Vacancies Act as an “obscure statute”); Vacant Government, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at
A18 (“Clinton aids privately dismiss the . . . Vacancies Act as burdensome and obscure . . . .”).
38. Oversight of the Implementation of the Vacancies Act, Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, Mar. 18, 1998 (Statement of Joseph N. Onek, Principal Deputy Asso-
ciate Attorney General, Department of Justice, and Daniel Koffsky, Special Counsel, Office of
Legal Counsel), available at 1998 WL 8993549 [hereinafter Onek Statement] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
39. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 14, 1998) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
40. Onek Statement, supra note 38, at 9-10.
41. 144 CONG. REC. S6405-06, *S6416 (June 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see
also 144 CONG. REC. S12,810-06, S12,824 (Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“It is my
hope that this legislation, which makes several substantive changes to the current Vacancies
Act, will protect this vital constitutional ‘safeguard’ by bringing to an end a quarter century of
obfuscation, bureaucratic intransigence, and outright circumvention.”).
42. Letter from Erskine Bowles, White House Chief of Staff, to Trent Lott, Senate Major-
ity Leader (July 28, 1998) (demanding that the Senate (1) loosen the Act’s restrictions on who
can serve in an “acting” capacity, (2) add a safety valve to avert possible interference with duties
critical to national security, criminal law enforcement, public health and safety, or the stability
of financial markets, and (3) increase the Act’s allotted time for new administrations to fill posi-
tions) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
43. Stephen Green, Senate Fails to Force Out Appointee, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Sept.
29, 1998, at A5 (reporting that the Republican-controlled Senate fell seven votes short of the
sixty votes required to end a Democratic filibuster of the Act).
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the Senate to consider presidential nominees more quickly and
fairly.44
On October 21, 1998, however, the Act reappeared in an
amended form.45 Retaining its essentials but modified to address some
of the earlier concerns of Senate Democrats and the Administration,
Congress passed the Act as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999.46 Presented
with the all-encompassing Omnibus Act only two weeks before the
1998 congressional election and one day after the House Judiciary
Committee announced its intention to conduct impeachment hear-
ings, President Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Act, and with it
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998.47
44. Id. Democrats’ opposition to the version of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998
proposed in September 1998 also may have been motivated by the Clinton administration’s re-
newal of its objections to the Act just four days before the vote. Statement of Administration
Policy from Office of Management and Budget to the Senate (Sept. 24, 1998),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/legislative/sap/1998/S2176-s.html (reiterating that President
Clinton’s senior advisers will recommend that he veto the Act “if the bill is not amended to ad-
dress the Administration’s concerns . . . fully described in the attached Erskine Bowles 7/28/98
letter to the Senate”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
45. 144 CONG. REC. S12,810-06, *S12,824 (statement of Sen. Byrd) (Oct. 21, 1998) (“Mr.
President, because I am an original sponsor of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, and because
the Act as it is being enacted differs somewhat from the bill reported to the Senate by the
Committee on Governmental Affairs on July 15, 1998, (S. Rpt. 105-250), I wish to offer my per-
spective . . . .”).
46. Id. at *S12,822 (statement of Act co-sponsor Sen. Thompson) (Oct. 21, 1998) (“Mr.
President, I am pleased that the essentials of [the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998] have
been incorporated into the Omnibus Appropriations bill . . . .”); Bill Summary and Status for
the 105th Congress—H.R. 4328 (Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations Act of 1999), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349d (Supp. V 1999). To date, neither President Clinton nor any
member of his Administration has explained why the President signed into law an Act to which
he twice objected and which significantly and unconstitutionally upsets the balance of power on
federal appointments. The timing of the midterm congressional election and Congress’s im-
peachment hearings are plausible explanations.
Because the Omnibus Act authorized substantial additional appropriations for numer-
ous causes that Clinton supported (e.g., education and job training, welfare-to-work programs,
health care, environmental protection, law and civil rights enforcement, and hurricane relief to
farmers), Clinton likely thought it wiser to sign the bill and publicly note its objectionable provi-
sions than to risk losing time-sensitive public support for himself and Democratic candidates by
vetoing the bill. In his signing statement, Clinton did publicly object to some parts of the Act but
did not mention the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. In light of the bill’s timing, he may
have deliberately opted to focus his remarks on issues directly relevant to voters rather than on
a longstanding, seemingly “inside the Beltway” interbranch conflict. See generally Statement by
President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 4328, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2108 (Nov.
2, 1998), 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576 (championing the bill as a “significant step forward for Amer-
ica” but objecting to its ban on voluntary national student achievement tests, inadequate fund-
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II.  THE FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 replaces all prior Va-
cancies Acts and rewrites the law governing the President’s exercise
of the nomination and appointment powers in six significant ways.
First, the Act states that it is the exclusive statutory means for tempo-
rarily filling vacant advice and consent positions in the executive
branch,48 unless Congress explicitly legislates otherwise.49 No longer
can agencies use their enabling statutes as an alternative basis for or
superseding means of filling vacancies.50 Now, the President is re-
stricted to the means enumerated in the Act to appoint temporarily
all executive branch officers whose appointment requires Senate con-
firmation, except for a few specified officers.51
Second, the Act creates a new incentive for prompt submission
of nominations. During lengthy recesses or adjournments, the Presi-
dent’s submission of a written notification of intent to nominate a
named person to a designated vacant position when the Senate re-
convenes permits that person to occupy that position until the Senate
acts on the nomination.52 When the Senate reconvenes, it automati-
ing for air traffic control operations, and constraints on the President’s constitutional authority
to conduct foreign affairs and to recommend and use federal appropriations).
 In addition, Clinton may have signed the Act because the bill-signing provided an op-
portunity to shift the public’s attention away from impeachment hearings, to demonstrate his
commitment to continue to carry out his presidential duties, and to provide a positive legislative
achievement on which Democratic candidates could campaign while their party’s President was
being impeached. On the impeachment hearings, see Juliet Eilperin, Mid-November Hearings
on Impeachment Planned; Hyde Sets Meeting on Ground Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1998, at
A02 (reporting that House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde (R-IL) announced on
October 20 that impeachment hearings would begin “shortly after the election”).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a) (Supp. V 1999).
49. According to the Act, Congress can “state otherwise” either by expressly authorizing
the President, a court, or an executive agency head to fill a vacancy temporarily, or by desig-
nating by law an officer or employee to assume a particular vacant office temporarily. Id.
50. Id. § 3347(b). Since 1973, the Department of Justice has claimed that 28 U.S.C.
§ 509 and § 510, which vest all functions of that agency in the Attorney General and allow her to
delegate responsibility for carrying out those functions, provide an alternative, though equally
legitimate, basis for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent positions. See supra notes 26-
40 and accompanying text.
51. The Act does not apply to the temporary appointment of “holdovers,” officers who are
statutorily authorized to continue to serve in office after their term of years expires until a suc-
cessor is appointed or a statutorily specified amount of time passes. 5 U.S.C. § 3349b (Supp. V
1999). Nor does the Act apply to the temporary appointment of officers who serve on inde-
pendent multiple-member boards or commissions, to commissioners of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, to members of the Surface Transportation Board, or to any judge of
any court created under Article I of the Constitution. Id. § 3349c.
52. Id. § 3349d(a).
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cally treats the President’s written notification as it would treat an of-
ficial nomination.53 If the President does not actually submit the
nomination within two days after the recess or adjournment ends,
however, the Senate treats the nomination as withdrawn.54
Third, the Act limits the President’s choice of temporary ap-
pointees and their terms. When an officer dies, resigns, or is otherwise
unable to perform assigned duties (e.g., as a result of sickness, ab-
sence, or expiration of his term), the Act limits the President’s exer-
cise of the temporary appointment power to the following choices: (1)
the Senate-confirmed first assistant to the vacant office; (2) a Senate-
confirmed officer who currently works in an executive agency; or (3)
a career civil servant, paid at or above the GS-15 rate, who has
worked in the agency in which the vacancy exists for at least 90 of the
past 365 days.55 The Act bars the President from temporarily ap-
pointing any person who has been nominated to fill the vacant posi-
tion but has not served as first assistant to that position for at least 90
of the past 365 days.56 Moreover, the Act strictly limits all temporary
appointees’ terms of service to 210 days from the date that the posi-
tion became vacant.57 If, however, the President submits to the Senate
a first or second nomination to fill the vacant position, the temporary
appointee may continue to serve until 210 days after the Senate re-
jects or returns the nomination or the President withdraws it.58
Fourth, the Act contains a new enforcement mechanism that
punishes statutory noncompliance. If the President fails to comply
with the Act, then the vacant office must remain vacant,59 and no one
except the agency head may carry out the duties that are assigned by
statute or regulation solely to that office.60 Any actions taken by an
official not temporarily appointed in compliance with the Act have no
effect and cannot be ratified in the future, except by an act of Con-
gress.61 In other words, if the President fails to nominate a person to a
vacant position within 210 days and exhausts the temporary appoint-
53. Id.
54. Id. § 3349d(b).
55. Id. § 3345(a).
56. Id. § 3345(b).
57. Id. § 3346(a)(1).
58. Id. § 3346(a)-(b).
59. Id. § 3348(d).
60. Id. § 3348(b)(2).
61. Id. § 3348(d).
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ment options enumerated in the Act,62 the President forfeits his tem-
porary appointment power and must submit a nomination or use the
recess appointment power to fill the vacant position.63
Fifth, the Act requires that the executive branch fully disclose
vacancies-related information to Congress and the Comptroller Gen-
eral.64 In particular, each executive agency head must “immediately”
report to the House, Senate, and Comptroller General the following
information: the title of any vacant position;65 the name of the acting
officer serving in that position and the date her service began;66 the
name of any person nominated to fill the vacancy and the date of her
nomination;67 and the date of any rejection, withdrawal, or return of a
nomination.68 If the Comptroller General determines that an acting
officer has exceeded the authorized term of 210 days plus any appli-
cable exceptions, the Comptroller General must report that determi-
nation to specified House and Senate Committees, the President, and
the Office of Personnel Management.69
Sixth, the Act makes special provision for vacancies that occur
during presidential transitions. For any vacancy that exists during the
first two months after inauguration day, the new President has 90
days in addition to the regular 210 days (300 total) to submit a nomi-
nation.70 In other words, a new President can temporarily appoint a
person to act in any such position for as many as the first 300 days of
his first term, plus any time during which the Senate is in recess or is
adjourned. Moreover, if the President fails to nominate a person to
fill a vacant position within those 300-plus days or exhausts the avail-
able options for temporary appointment under the Act, then the
President must leave the position vacant until he submits a nomina-
62. Id. § 3345 (detailing the procedures for a President’s selection of temporary officers to
fill vacant executive agency positions).
63. Id. § 3348(c). Part (e) of § 3348 also specifies that it does not apply to the General
Counsels of the National Labor Relations Board or Federal Labor Relations Authority, con-
firmed Inspectors General or Chief Financial Officers, or executive branch officers whose duties
cannot, by statutory mandate, be assumed by an agency head. Id. § 3348(e).
64. The Comptroller General of the United States is the head of the General Accounting
Office (GAO). UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 2000-2001, at 46 (2000); see also id. at
49 (“Supporting the Congress is GAO’s fundamental responsibility.”).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 3349(a)(1).
66. Id. § 3349(a)(2).
67. Id. § 3349(a)(3).
68. Id. § 3349(a)(4).
69. Id. § 3349(b).
70. Id. § 3349a.
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tion or fills it with a recess appointee.71 Any actions taken by an acting
official serving in that position have no effect.72
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 suffers from at least
four constitutional problems: (1) the Act allows the Senate to confirm
or reject people whom the President never officially nominated; (2)
the Act gives the Senate an impermissible role in making recess ap-
pointments; (3) the Act encroaches on the President’s ability to
nominate and control subordinate executive officers; and (4) the Act
transfers too much of the Senate’s power in the appointment process
to the President in the year following a presidential transition.
A. Unconstitutional Empowerment of the Senate to Nominate
Officers of the United States
First, the Act allows the Senate to treat a President’s written no-
tice of intent to nominate as a nomination, despite the fact that the
President has yet to and may never nominate the named individual to
an advice and consent position. Such treatment of a President’s writ-
ten notice of intent to nominate violates both the “formalist” and
“functionalist” Supreme Court decisions on federal appointment is-
sues.
The “formalist” cases read the Constitution as assigning distinct
powers to each branch and delimiting the extent to which the
branches may share those powers.73 The formalist approach to separa-
tion of powers focuses on the logical meaning of the Constitution’s
text and what is known about the Framers’ intent.74 The formalist ap-
proach tends to disregard other reasons for decision, such as institu-
tional competence, historical developments, and policy implications.75
During the twentieth century, the Court used this approach to invali-
date three types of statutory provisions: those that conditioned the
President’s power to remove an executive officer on the consent of
71. Id. §§ 3346, 3349a(b).
72. Id. § 3348(d).
73. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1522-27 (1991).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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the Senate,76 those that allowed Congress to retain removal power
over officers exercising executive functions,77 and those that permitted
Congress to appoint executive officers.78 The core problem with those
three statutory provisions was Congress’s attempt, at another
branch’s expense, to aggrandize its power over who occupies a federal
executive position.79
The Court likely would take a similarly formalist approach in
evaluating the Act’s constitutionality. The Act allows the Senate to
exercise what is plainly executive authority: the discretion to choose
who will be officially nominated to an advice and consent position.
Since preventing one branch from usurping power constitutionally as-
signed to another branch was a primary concern of the Framers, for-
malist analysis is appropriate in determining whether the Act is con-
stitutional.
Such analysis suggests that the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of
1998 is unconstitutional because neither the Constitution’s text nor
any expressions of the Framers’ intent indicates that the Senate
should have any role in choosing nominees. The text of Article 2, Sec-
tion 2 plainly states that the power of nomination is vested in the
President, not in the Senate.80 “The grammatical structure of the
clause separates the Senate’s review from the President’s nomination;
the phrase ‘[b]y and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate’
modifies ‘appoint,’ but is separated from ‘nominate.’”81 As the Court
has periodically noted, the nomination process is “the sole act of the
76. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109-77 (1926) (relying primarily on discussion from
the Constitutional Convention and the First Congress, and on the Constitution’s text, to hold
that “the power to remove officers appointed by the President and the Senate [is] vested in the
President alone”).
77. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-27 (1986) (using statements from the Constitu-
tional Convention, the First Congress, and the Constitution’s text to hold that “congressional
control” over an executive officer, exemplified by the power to remove, “is constitutionally im-
permissible”).
78. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-41 (1975) (quoting various constitutional provisions,
including Article II, Section 2, The Federalist Papers, and statements from the Constitutional
Convention to stress the importance of separation of powers and to support the invalidation of a
law that gave Congress the power to appoint officers who perform executive functions).
79. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell & Jed Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on
Line Item Vetoes and Separation of Powers, 47 DUKE L.J. 1171, 1206 (1998) (“[I]f Members of
Congress were able to give themselves the power to execute, interpret, or adjudicate their own
laws, then Congress would have no check on its powers at all.”).
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
81. Gauch, supra note 13, at 339. Gauch also notes that some proponents of robust Senate
review concede that the nomination power belongs exclusively to the President. E.g., Mathias,
supra note 15, at 202.
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president” and “completely voluntary.”82 Although the Senate can
curb the President’s authority to nominate in numerous ways (e.g., by
stipulating the qualifications of appointees to congressionally created
offices or act slowly on a President’s nomination), it cannot designate
whom the President selects to fill a particular office.83 Until the Presi-
dent officially nominates a specific person to a specific office, the
Senate cannot confirm or reject that person, consider that person
withdrawn, or return the nomination to the President.
The Act, however, effectively empowers the Senate unilaterally
to make those decisions. When the President submits a written notice
of intent to nominate a specific person to a specific office after a re-
cess or adjournment, the Act authorizes the Senate to treat that writ-
ten notice as an official nomination.84 If the President does not then
officially nominate the specified person to the specified office within
two days of the Senate’s next meeting, the Act authorizes the Senate
to treat the written notice qua official nomination as withdrawn.85 In
doing so, the Act has three unconstitutional consequences. It effec-
tively allows the Senate to nominate a person whom the President has
yet to and may never nominate. It permits an antagonistic Senate to
convene and confirm or reject on the first day back from recess a per-
son whom the President may have intended to nominate but ulti-
mately decided not to nominate to a specified (or any other) advice
and consent position. It also facilitates creation of a permanent,
though inaccurate, public record in the Executive Proceedings of the
Senate indicating that a President nominated and then withdrew a
specific person, even though the President may have merely submit-
ted a written notice of intent to nominate and then opted not to pro-
ceed.
Such unilateral Senate nomination and confirmation or rejection
was clearly rejected by the Framers. The Framers deliberately chose
to place the nomination power outside of the Senate for two reasons.
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803) (emphasis added).
83. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 39, 50-51 (1852); see also Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926):
It is argued that the denial of the legislative power to regulate removals in some way
involves the denial of power to prescribe qualifications for office, or reasonable classi-
fication for promotion, and yet that has been often exercised. We see no conflict be-
tween the latter power and that of appointment and removal, provided of course that
the qualifications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to
be in effect legislative designation.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 3349(d) (Supp. V 1999).
85. Id.
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First, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[O]ne man of discernment is
better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to
particular offices than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of su-
perior discernment.”86 Second, as Nathaniel Gorham, the sponsor of
the advice and consent system, and other delegates said during the
Constitutional Convention, giving that power to a legislative body
would result in appointments based on political dealing, patronage,
favoritism, large states’ domination of the process, or considerations
other than a person’s proper qualifications.87 Since then, Congress’s
general practice has been to concede that the power of nomination is
vested in the President alone and that this power is an essential part
of the Constitution’s checks and balances system. For the most part,
Congress also has conceded that the Senate’s confirmation power,
even in its most robust form, is a negative power that permits the
Senate to “ratify or reject the choice [of the President]” but not to
designate who shall fill a particular office or to subject to the Senate’s
confirmation process persons who have not been nominated.88
The “functionalist” approach likewise suggests that the Act is
unconstitutional. The functionalist approach reads the Constitution to
favor balancing the branches’ competing interests to ensure that the
branches do not threaten each others’ core functions.89 The Court
used this approach in Morrison v. Olson to uphold a statute delegat-
ing the executive function of criminal prosecution to an independent
counsel not formally associated with any of the branches.90 The Court
also used the approach in Mistretta v. United States to uphold Con-
gress’s delegation of lawmaking power to the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, at least three of whose members are statutorily re-
quired to be judges.91
The Act violates the separation of powers doctrine under the
functionalist cases because it threatens to infringe upon the core ex-
ecutive function of nominating qualified individuals to advice and
consent positions. Central to the successful fulfillment of that function
is the President’s pre-nomination ability to evaluate fully an individ-
ual’s fitness for a position and chances of confirmation. An important
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 14, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton).
87. Gauch, supra note 13, at 344-47; David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, The
Constitution, and The Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L. J. 1491, 1496 (1992).
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
89. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 10, at 386 n.2.
90. 487 U.S. 654, 693-95 (1987).
91. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1988).
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tool in that respect is the written notice of intent to nominate, which
helps the President to assess a potential nominee’s chances of confir-
mation further without exposing the person or the President’s judg-
ment to the unnecessary stigma that could result from formal Senate
disapproval of an official nomination.92
The current Act, though, would force the President to choose
among the following unpalatable courses of action: (1) submit a no-
tice of intent and risk the stigma of Senate hearings and possible re-
jection; (2) forgo unofficial notification and assume the political risks
that accompany an official nomination; or (3) possibly forgo nomina-
tion of a nominee altogether. In any of these cases, the Act would im-
pede the President’s ability to evaluate fully a potential nominee’s fit-
ness and chances, and thereby could weaken the core executive
function of nominating qualified individuals to advice and consent
positions.
B. Unconstitutional Interference with the President’s Authority to
Make Recess Appointments
The second constitutional flaw in the Federal Vacancies Reform
Act of 1998 is that it illegitimately interferes with the President’s ex-
ercise of constitutional authority to make recess appointments. Again,
the formalist and functionalist approaches are instructive.
A formalist likely would invalidate the Act because it violates
Article II, Section 2, which authorizes the President “to fill up all Va-
cancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.” 93 The Ap-
pointments Clause does not give the Senate a role in that process.94
The Framers adopted the Clause “without a dissenting vote and with
virtually no record to fix intent and scope.”95 The Department of Jus-
92. PAUL CHARLES LIGHT, A SURVIVOR’S GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 35
(2000):
If you have been selected for a high-profile job, or a job that has been vacant for a
while and prompted stories about internal disarray within the administration, the
White House may have already announced the president’s intent to nominate you. . . .
The White House Press Office will put out a three- or four-paragraph news release
announcing the president’s intention to nominate you and detailing your work his-
tory, where you went to college and what the position entails.
See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 14, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that
the Senate’s “dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected and might have
the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the Chief Magistrate”).
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
94. Id.
95. FISHER, supra note 11, at 38.
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tice has long interpreted the Clause broadly to mean that the Presi-
dent may use the recess appointment power to fill vacancies that oc-
cur while the Senate is in session and not solely while it is in recess.96
Moreover, the only published judicial opinion referring to this power
recognizes that the President may have inherent constitutional
authority to make interim appointments.97
The Act violates this clear and total vesting of the recess ap-
pointment power in the President by giving Congress a role in making
recess appointments. Specifically, the Act states that the President
may not use the recess appointment power to appoint to an advice
and consent position anyone who does not meet the time and eligibil-
ity requirements that Congress set out in the Act.98 The Act also voids
the actions of any acting officer who fails to meet those requirements
unless Congress expressly says otherwise.99 Moreover, the Act pur-
ports to override the President’s recess appointment power altogether
if the President fails to comply with the Act and exhausts all options
available under it.100
Proponents of greater congressional power might counter that
Congress needs to be able to set limits on the President’s recess ap-
pointment power lest the President use that power to circumvent the
constitutional requirement of Senate consent.101 That argument, how-
ever, tilts the balance of power too far in favor of the Senate. An ex-
ample illustrates this shortcoming. Suppose that the Senate decides
informally that it will reject any nominee who has actively partici-
pated in a partisan political campaign. Nothing in the Constitution
96. Id. at 38 n.61 (listing numerous Justice Department opinions supporting the proposition
that recess appointments can be made while the Senate is in session).
97. Williams v. Phillips, 482 F.2d 669, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (noting that “[i]t
could be argued that . . . the President [has] an implied power, in the absence of limiting legisla-
tion . . . to appoint an acting director for a reasonable period of time before submitting the
nomination of a new director to the Senate”).
98. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3346 (Supp. V 1999) (detailing the time and eligibility requirements
regarding the appointment of acting officers); supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d) (“An action taken by any person who [does not meet the time and
eligibility requirements] . . . shall have no force or effect.”).
100. Id. § 3348(a) (“Unless an officer or employee is performing the functions and duties [of
the vacant office] in accordance with sections 3345, 3346, and 3347 . . . the office shall remain
vacant . . . .”).
101. Oversight of the Implementation of the Vacancies Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, Mar. 18, 1998 (Statement of Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in Ameri-
can Public Law, Congressional Research Service), available at 1998 WL 8993467 (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
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appears to prevent the Senate from doing so.102 But such an action by
the Senate might prevent the President from carrying out the Presi-
dent’s duty, under Article II, Section 3, to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”103 In a parallel fashion, subjecting the Presi-
dent’s recess appointment power to Senate restrictions might signifi-
cantly limit the President’s ability to carry out his constitutionally
authorized duty to “take care.” The Framers could not have intended
that result, so they probably also did not intend that Congress should
limit the President’s exercise of the recess appointment power. Be-
cause the Act’s multiple time and eligibility qualifications for recess
appointees limit the President’s use of the recess appointment
power,104 it is unconstitutional.
A functionalist, too, likely would invalidate the Act because it
circumscribes the President’s power to make recess appointments,
thereby impairing the President’s ability to accomplish constitution-
ally assigned functions. Though the text of the Constitution plainly
vests the authority to make recess appointments in the President,105
several modern cases reject a requirement of absolute independence
and make clear that mere interference with one branch’s freedom of
action does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.106 Indeed,
since 1863 Congress has passed numerous statutory restrictions on the
President’s recess appointment power in order to prevent an “ambi-
tious, corrupt or tyrannical executive”107 from using that power to un-
dermine the Senate’s authority to confirm appointments.108
102. Although the Supreme Court has stated that Congress may not enact legislation pro-
viding that “no Republican . . . shall be appointed to federal office,” it has also strongly inti-
mated that Congress could refuse to confirm nominees who engage in partisan political activi-
ties. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (finding that the Civil Service
Commission could discipline an employee who acted as a ward executive committeeman of a
political party).
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
104. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345, 3346, 3348.
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session.”).
106. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1989) (holding that Congress did
not violate the separation of powers principle by empowering the President to appoint or re-
move members of the United States Sentencing Commission); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977) (rejecting former President Nixon’s argument that the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Act violates the separation of powers principle).
107. FISHER, supra note 11, at 40 (quoting S. REP. NO. 38-80, at 5-6 (1863)).
108. Id. at 26-27, 40 (observing that Congress has leveraged its power of the purse to with-
hold, pending confirmation, funds to pay the salaries of acting officials whom the President ap-
pointed during a recess to fill an advice and consent position that was vacant while the Senate
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Nonetheless, the Act is unconstitutional, because it facilitates
more congressional interference with the President’s core ability to
make recess appointments than Mistretta allows.109 The Act not only
restricts the pool of potential recess and temporary appointees, but
also deprives a President who refuses to comply with the Act of the
constitutionally given authority to make a recess or temporary ap-
pointment to a vacant advice and consent position. The potential im-
plications of those problems are best illustrated by an example.
Suppose that the Secretary of Defense becomes ill, resigns, or
dies. Unless the President officially nominates a new Secretary, the
Act limits the President’s choice of temporary or recess appointees to
first assistants, other Senate-confirmed officials, and high-level civil
servants who have worked in the agency in which the vacancy oc-
curred for ninety days of the past year.110 The President may not, for
example, appoint a former Secretary of Defense who has retired or
now works in the private sector. Now suppose that the President ap-
points an acting Secretary from that congressionally restricted pool of
potential replacements. During the ensuing 210 days, the President
searches for someone whom he can officially nominate but is repeat-
edly distracted by America’s entanglement in an international con-
flict. At this point, the acting Secretary of Defense has exceeded the
Act’s 210-day limit and must vacate the position.111 The Act voids any
subsequent action taken by the acting Secretary,112 such as executing a
presidential order to deploy troops to the region of conflict. Until the
President either officially nominates a new Secretary or waits until
the next Senate recess to appoint another acting Secretary, the Act
requires that the cabinet post remain vacant and bars the President
from using his constitutionally authorized recess appointment power
to fill that vacancy.113 In doing so, the Act inadequately recognizes the
was in session; that Congress has used its power of advice and consent aggressively to condition
its consent upon the President’s nomination of an appointee who meets a long list of qualifica-
tions stipulated by Congress; and that senators have wielded their leadership positions and in-
fluence over legislative proposals by the President to bully the President into or to block him
from appointing particular candidates).
109. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a) (Supp. V 1999).
111. Id. § 3346.
112. Id. § 3348.
113. Because § 3347(a) establishes the Act as “the exclusive means” for temporarily
authorizing an acting official to perform the functions of a vacant advice and consent position,
the Act appears to bar even a President’s use of an executive order to set forth an automatic line
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difficulties that these types of restrictions may impose on a Presi-
dent’s ability to execute faithfully his constitutional duties to serve as
commander-in-chief and to protect and defend the United States.114
C. Unconstitutional Encroachment on the President’s Authority to
Nominate and Control Subordinate Executive Officers
A third constitutional problem with the Act is that its reporting
requirement facilitates congressional encroachment on the Presi-
dent’s long-recognized prerogative to nominate and control subordi-
nate executive officers. Simple statutory reporting requirements are
constitutional as a general matter.115 Nonetheless, past administrations
have successfully challenged statutory provisions that require an ex-
ecutive agency to report specified information directly to Congress,
on the grounds that the provisions prevent “the Executive Branch
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”116 The
Act’s reporting requirement is just such a provision: it obligates each
agency head to report any vacancy, temporary appointment, or offi-
cial nomination directly and immediately to Congress, without clear-
ance from the President.117
Suppose that the Act imposed its reporting requirement not on
the head of each executive agency, but on the President alone. Such a
provision would be constitutional because it would serve the legiti-
mate congressional purpose of overseeing the activities of the execu-
tive branch. Such a provision also would be constitutional because it
of succession to act for an ill, absent, or deceased Secretary of Defense. For an example of such
an order, see Exec. Order No. 13,000, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,483 (Apr. 24, 1996).
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
115. 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 344 (1854) (explaining that “Congress may at all times call on
[the executive departments] for information or explanation in matters of official duty”); see also
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.19 (1983) (describing means of congressional control over its
“administrative creatures,” such as “formal reporting requirements”); The Constitutional Sepa-
ration of Powers Between the President and Congress, Op. Off. Legal Counsel § II.D.2 (May 7,
1996) (“Simple reporting requirements . . . are clearly constitutional as a general matter.”),
available at 1996 WL 876050 [hereinafter Constitutional Separation of Powers]. Despite the
general constitutionality of simple statutory reporting requirements, specific instances of con-
gressional oversight of executive actions still might be objectionable on policy and executive
privilege grounds. E.g., 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 242, 243 (1820) (advising Henry Clay, then House
Speaker and later Senator, Secretary of State, and three-time presidential candidate, that ren-
dering legal advice to the House not only would “enlarg[e] the sphere of [the Attorney Gen-
eral’s] official duties beyond that which is prescribed by law,” but also would be “incalculably
dangerous” to the nation’s republican form of government).
116. E.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 3349.
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would not erode any executive privilege, since information about fed-
eral vacancies and the personnel temporarily filling them is not privi-
leged.
Now suppose that the Act directed each agency head to submit
vacancies-related information to the President for review before for-
warding it to Congress. For the same reasons, this reporting require-
ment would be constitutional, though its bureaucratic nature might
raise concerns about interference with the President’s central consti-
tutional obligations.118
Finally, consider the Act in its actual form. The Act directs each
agency head to submit information about vacancies and nominations
directly and immediately to Congress, without presidential clear-
ance.119 That requirement appears to be unconstitutional because it
“interrupt[s] the lines of responsibility within the executive branch
and interfere[s] with a presidential prerogative to control the presen-
tation of the executive branch’s views to Congress.”120 Such interfer-
ence could result in awkward situations for the President and may
even be an unconstitutional erosion of presidential authority, as the
following example illustrates.
Suppose that the Secretary of Commerce dies suddenly. The
President wants to announce the Secretary’s death and to name a
temporary replacement or official nominee very quickly to minimize
public fear of economic instability.121 In such a situation, the Act
would compel the Department of Commerce to report the vacancy
caused by the Secretary’s death directly and immediately to Congress.
While the Department probably would inform the President before it
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 3349.
120. Constitutional Separation of Powers, supra note 115, § II.D.2 (citing 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 632 (1982); 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 17 (1977)); see also Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 162-63 (1926) (discussing the power of the President to remove inferior officers);
Cong. Constr. Corp. v. United States, 314 F.2d 527, 530-32 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (holding that the
President must have the authority to review the discretionary executive actions of subordinate
officials).
121. President Clinton faced such a situation in April 1996, when Secretary of Commerce
Ron Brown was killed along with thirty-four others, including several corporate executives, in a
plane crash in Croatia. In appointing U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to replace
Brown, the President noted that “he wanted to fill Brown’s position quickly ‘to send a signal
that we don’t intend to miss a beat’ in pushing his economic policies.” William Neikirk, Clinton
Looks for Continuity; He Selects Kantor to Replace Brown, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1996, at 1.
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informed Congress of this news, it is possible that the Department
would report the matter to Congress before the President had suffi-
cient time to manage this politically sensitive situation. As a practical
political matter, the Act’s reporting requirement could at a minimum
undermine the President’s ability to manage the executive branch ef-
fectively by imposing potentially conflicting duties (i.e., the duties of
obedience to the President and disclosure to Congress) upon subor-
dinate executive officers and by limiting the amount of time the
President has to plan and execute a strategic response. In this way,
the requirement increases congressional leverage over the President
and other executive branch officials and thereby risks eroding the
Constitution’s “‘great principle of unity and responsibility in the Ex-
ecutive department.”’122
D. Unconstitutional Power Shift Toward the President Following a
Presidential Transition
The three constitutional problems discussed above focus on ways
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 unduly interferes with the
President’s constitutional authority. That is not to say, however, that
the Act is free of constitutional problems from Congress’s point of
view. A fourth constitutional difficulty is that the Act tilts the Senate-
President balance of power dangerously toward almost-unilateral
presidential control over federal appointments during the first 300
days of a new President’s administration.
The Framers required the President to seek the Senate’s consent
to his nominations because they feared that the President might ap-
point individuals based solely on private inclinations and interests, as
British monarchs had done.123 The Framers thought that requiring the
Senate’s concurrence “would be an excellent check upon a spirit of
favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the ap-
pointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family con-
nection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.”124
Still, the Framers anticipated that Senate consent would be relatively
routine, because the President’s concern for reputation and reelection
would make him “ashamed and afraid” to appoint undeserving can-
122. Myers, 272 U.S. at 131 (quoting James Madison).
123. FISHER, supra note 11, at 22-23 (describing the Framers’ rejection of the British
model).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 14, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton).
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didates “possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render
them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.”125
The Act, however, facilitates presidential appointments based on
patronage and potential for “pliancy” by effectively giving a newly in-
augurated President a “blank check” for appointments during the
first 300 days of his first term.126 The Act authorizes a newly elected
President to appoint acting officers to every advice and consent posi-
tion in the executive branch for up to 300 days after either inaugura-
tion day or the date on which the vacancy occurred, whichever is
later.127 As long as the President nominates a person to each of those
offices by the 300th day, the President will not lose the temporary ap-
pointment power.128 In other words, the Act effectively empowers a
new President to staff and run the executive branch for almost an en-
tire year without subjecting any acting appointees to confirmation.
Because the Act permits newly elected presidents to engage inde-
pendently in precisely the kind of favoritism the Framers sought to
prevent, it is unconstitutional.
Proponents of the Act might counter that the Act does not free
the President of accountability for appointments made during the first
year in office; it merely suspends the Senate’s exercise of its consent
power until the 300th day of a new President’s first term. That argu-
ment, however, has two flaws. One flaw is that this counter-argument
actually strengthens a President’s claim that Congress cannot in any
way condition a President’s temporary appointment power. In creat-
ing a 300-day window for initial submission of nominations to the
Senate, the Act implies that a President may, for 300 days, make tem-
porary appointments that are not subject to Senate confirmation. A
300-day period is a relatively long time in political life, and there is no
300-day period during which the Senate is not in session. The Act
thus ironically encourages the President not to take seriously the con-
stitutional obligation to submit nominations promptly to the Senate
for confirmation. Should the Senate charge the President with failure
to submit any nominations before the 300-day period expires, the
President can just point to the language of the Act and argue that he
is still within the 300-day period that Congress itself authorized. In
this way, the Act converts the President’s obligation to heed the Ap-
125. Id. at 458.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 3349a (Supp. V 1999).
127. Id. § 3349a(b).
128. Id. § 3348.
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pointments Clause’s advice and consent requirement into an obliga-
tion merely not to appoint acting officials for more than 299 days be-
fore officially nominating someone to a given advice and consent
post. That result, if not unconstitutional, is at least highly undesirable
to the Senate.
A second flaw is that suspending the Constitution’s consent re-
quirement until the 300th day of a new President’s first term impru-
dently, if not unconstitutionally, expands executive branch powers at
the expense of the legislative branch. Political scientists have ob-
served that a President’s power to appoint is particularly important
during the first few months of the first term.129 Made toward the end
of the peak period of public interest that accompanies national elec-
tions, initial appointments possess an inherent symbolism that a
President may use in four powerful ways: “[1] to lay the groundwork
for political relationships that will directly affect the future success of
his administration, [2] to reward those who have supported him in the
past, [3] to broaden his base of support within his own party, with or-
ganized interest groups, and in the Congress,” and [4] to cement his
role as the executive branch’s “central creative and directive force.”130
Allocation of that much unbridled power to a single person already
inclined to draw power to himself (as freeing the President of ac-
countability for appointments made during the first 300 days in office
does) not only is unwise, but also is precisely what the Framers sought
to avoid by requiring the Senate’s consent.131 For that reason, the con-
stitutionality of the Act’s provisions for newly elected presidents re-
mains in doubt.
IV. POSSIBLE RESPONSES
The constitutional barriers to a statutorily delimited appointment
process that meets the needs and interests of the executive and legis-
lative branches leave three avenues for those determined to prevent
the President from circumventing the Senate’s confirmation preroga-
tive. One route, though certainly the most difficult in practice, is to
amend Article II, Section 2 to authorize explicitly a greater Senate
role in the nomination and appointment processes.132 A second option
129. E.g., G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 6
(1981).
130. Id. at 5-9.
131. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
132. The author is not aware of any current proposal to amend the appointments-related
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is to modify the Act so that it properly respects the allocation of fed-
eral appointment authority that the Framers intended and enshrined
in the Appointments Clause. For the reasons discussed in this Note,133
such modifications would necessarily delete the provision that em-
powers the Senate to nominate and confirm or reject individuals who
have not been nominated by the President,134 reassign the monitoring
and reporting requirements from the executive agency heads to the
President, and reduce (if not eliminate) the time period the Act gives
to a newly inaugurated President.135 Finally, a third possibility is to re-
peal the Act and relegate the Senate to using only its enumerated
powers of confirmation and of the purse, or its informal power to
horse-trade with the President, in a manner that respects the Consti-
tution’s allocation of appointment authority.
CONCLUSION
Since the ratification of the Constitution, the appointment power
enumerated in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution has operated
in “a framework of studied ambiguity, its limits established for the
most part not by court decisions but by imaginative accommodations
between the executive and legislative branches.”136 Though much def-
erence has been given to the President’s exercise of the power to
nominate and to make recess and temporary appointments, Congress
has periodically “police[d] the borders of th[at] power by imposing
statutory constraints and conditions.”137 The Federal Vacancies Re-
form Act of 1998 represents Congress’s most recent attempt to do so.
A historic revision of the appointment process, the Act employs sev-
eral new statutory mechanisms to expand and protect the Senate’s in-
terest, at the expense of presidential authority, in preventing the
President from evading the Senate’s confirmation prerogative. Rather
than arriving at the new legislation through a deliberative and col-
laborative process that included the President, the Department of
Justice, and other executive officials, however, Congress hustled the
Act through the legislative process and sent it, buried deep in a veto-
clauses in Article 2, Section 2.
133. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
134. 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (Supp. V 1999).
135. Id. § 3349a.
136. FISHER, supra note 11, at 48.
137. Id.
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proof appropriations bill, to a vulnerable President for signing.138 As a
result, the Act represents a one-sided response to mounting concern
about perversions of the federal appointment process. Little effort
was made to preserve the delicate balance, shaped by centuries of
rules and norms, between the President’s need to staff his administra-
tion fully and efficiently and the Senate’s desire to maintain its power
of advice and consent. To ensure that the federal appointment proc-
ess functions as the Framers intended and as the constitutional sepa-
ration and balance of power require, both the Senate and Congress as
a whole would do well to remember “that the decision as to who will
make the decision affects what decisions will be made,” and that the
Constitution squarely vests that initial decisionmaking power con-
cerning federal appointments in the President.139
138. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
139. John Anthony Maltese, The Presidency and the Judiciary, in THE PRESIDENCY AND
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 507 (Michael Nelson ed., 1994) (quoting Memorandum from Tom
Charles Huston, former White House aide, to President Nixon 1 (Mar. 25, 1969)).
